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Kelo v. City of New London: New Jersey’s  
Take on Takings 
The Honorable Peter G. Sheridan∗
INTRODUCTION 
The United States Supreme Court set off a firestorm of contro-
versy last summer when it permitted condemnation of homes in the 
Fort Trumbull area of New London, Connecticut.1  In broad terms, 
Kelo v. City of New London stands for the seemingly innocuous proposi-
tion that the  government may condemn a property for economic de-
velopment purposes.2  Justice O’Connor’s dissent lit up the newspa-
pers with her conclusion that “[n]othing is to prevent the State from 
replacing any Motel 6 with a Ritz Carlton, any home with a shopping 
mall, or any farm with a factory.”3  She found that there was no 
longer any reasonable “constraint” upon the use of eminent domain.4
The average American was jolted by the decision because Ameri-
can families believe that their homes are sacrosanct5 (“a man’s home 
is his castle”), and vitally important because they are a major asset to 
the family.  In basic civics courses, Americans learn that private prop-
erty interests are protected from the government’s reach except in 
extraordinary circumstances.6  In addition, Americans take pride in 
 ∗ United States District Judge, District of New Jersey.  Formerly of Graham, Cur-
tin & Sheridan.  Thank you to my assistant, Harriett Tyrrell, for her assistance with 
this Article. 
 1 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
 2 Id. at 2668–69. 
 3 Id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 4 Id. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor believes that the re-
sult of the Kelo decision is to delete “for public use” from the Takings Clause.  Id. at 
2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 5 See Jon Gertner, Chasing Ground, N.Y. TIMES MAGAZINE, Oct. 16, 2005, at 46, 52; 
see generally Jesse Holland, New London Woman Asks Congress to Step Into Eminent Domain 
Case, NEWSDAY.COM, Sept. 21, 2005 (on file with author). 
 6 Property rights were recognized far before the birth of the United States, but 
the Constitution secures them for certain.  Madison said “[g]overnment is instituted 
to protect property of every sort. . . .  This being the end of government, that alone is 
a just government, which impartially secures to every man, whatever is his own.”  
James Madison, Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 14 PAPERS OF 
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their homes and their communities.  Most Americans are unaware of 
the broad reach of the power of eminent domain.  They do not real-
ize that government may uproot a family for economic development 
purposes.  One Congressperson summed up the feelings of most citi-
zens by referring to the implications of the Kelo decision as “the most 
un-American thing that can be done.”7  This sentiment conflicts with 
the need for redevelopment in many American cities. 
Kelo was another split decision (5–4), which has become com-
monplace in recent years due to the differing constitutional views of 
the Justices.8  Rather than settling the law of eminent domain, the 
split decision has stimulated a lively debate over its boundaries and 
basic foundations.  At least twenty-five states are considering legisla-
tive initiatives to curb the use of eminent domain because of the Kelo 
decision.9  With a new Chief Justice at the helm, and another new 
member recently appointed, the issue will in all probability be re-
litigated before the Supreme Court of the United States.10  Due to the 
public outcry, the decision has resuscitated a narrower definition of 
the phrase “for public use,” which at least one legal commentator had 
pronounced dead more than fifty years ago!11
This paper will examine the public use requirement in light of 
the Kelo decision, with particular emphasis in Part II on its effect on 
 
JAMES MADISON 266 (R. Rutland et al. eds., 1983). 
 7 Kenneth R. Harney, Eminent Domain Ruling Has Strong Repercussions, WASH. 
POST, July 23, 2005, at F01. 
 8 See The Miers Blunder, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2005, at A14.  This editorial in the 
Wall Street Journal labeled the Kelo decision as an “evisceration of private property 
rights.”  Id. 
 9 See Ted Mann, Lawmakers to Review Eminent Domain Proposals, THE DAY, Sept. 28, 
2005 (on file with author) (noting that Connecticut is among the twenty-five states 
where state legislators have introduced bills to curb use of eminent domain); see also 
William Murphy, Discussing Seizures of Private Land, NEWSDAY, Sept. 21, 2005, at A24 
(explaining how the Kelo decision should not affect New York City’s seizure of private 
land). 
 10 See Shannon P. Duffy, Suit Against Philadelphia to Test Reach of Kelo Decision, N.J. 
L.J., Oct. 10, 2005, at 78 (reporting that a suit was instituted in Pennsylvania contend-
ing that a condemnation of land for use as a driveway for Federal Express does not 
meet Kelo standards). 
 11 Note, The Public Use Limitation on Eminent Domain: An Advance Requiem, 58 YALE 
L.J. 599, 614 (1949) [hereinafter Public Use Limitation].  In this note, the author con-
cludes that: 
     The Supreme Court has repudiated the doctrine of public use.  
Most state courts have arrived at the same conclusion, although rarely 
with so much directness.  Doubtless the doctrine will continue to be 
evoked nostalgically in dicta and may even be employed authoritatively 
in rare, atypical situations.  Kinder hands, however, would accord it the 
permanent interment in the digests that is so long overdue. 
Id. at 614. 
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New Jersey, and whether the dissent has invigorated a backlash that 
may limit the government’s exercise of its eminent domain power in 
the future. 
I. KELO GENERALLY 
A. Background 
The Fifth Amendment of the United States Constitution permits 
the government to take private property for public use, so long as 
reasonable compensation is paid.12  The Takings Clause simply states: 
“[N]or shall private property be taken for public use without just 
compensation.”13 The right of a sovereign to take private property 
can trace its roots at least as far back as formalized government,14 but 
the public use limitation has been applied differently over the years.  
Eminent domain was rarely invoked in the early years of the United 
States because there was plenty of land and natural resources.  It was 
employed for only two reasons: the construction of roads and the op-
eration of gristmills. 
In the early nineteenth century the public use limitation was 
read liberally and applied broadly in order to justify a taking for the 
public “good” or as a public “necessity.”15  At that time, many states 
allowed gristmill owners to construct dams in rivers in order to gen-
erate power for the mill.  The laws provided that the property owners 
whose lands flooded as a result of the dam would be compensated for 
the loss.  Although the mill was privately owned, the condemnation 
was justified as a “great advantage to the public.”16
As time passed, the mill acts were deemed to cover unintended 
applications that had minimal public impact, such as manufacturing 
 12 U.S. CONST. amend. V.  The Fifth Amendment states in full: 
     No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infa-
mous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, 
except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, 
when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any 
person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of 
life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without 
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, 
without just compensation. 
Id. 
 13 Id. 
 14 Public Use Limitation, supra note 11, at 600 n.5. 
 15 Id. at 601.  See also Lawrence Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Do-
main, 57 OR. L. REV. 203 (1977). 
 16 Berger, supra note 15, at 206. 
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facilities.17  Some courts frowned upon the broad application of the 
mill acts.  With the advent of the railroad, courts became increasingly 
concerned that “the public benefit standard would allow virtually 
unlimited invasions into the rights of private property.”18  Accord-
ingly, the courts imposed a narrower, more literal test: a taking could 
be justified only if the property taken was actually used by the public 
or if the public had the right to use the taken property.19
This narrower standard flourished in the mid-eighteen hun-
dreds.  However, in the latter half of the century, the proclivity of 
state and federal governments to employ eminent domain grew ex-
ponentially due to the needs of industrialized America and the ex-
pansion into the western United States.20  Condemnation was neces-
sary for construction of railroads in the West,21 designation of 
battleground memorials,22 irrigation of arid lands,23 and protection of 
mining rights,24 among other things.  At that time, some states gradu-
ally returned to the broader rule, which permitted government to 
take land if a public benefit—as opposed to actual use by the pub-
lic—existed.  The result was a hodge-podge of different rulings 
throughout the states. 
Surprisingly, it was not until the waning years of the eighteenth 
century that the Supreme Court began to exercise its authority to re-
view takings.25  In 1897, the Fifth Amendment was applied to the 
States by virtue of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.26  With the Supreme Court weighing in, the interests of pro-
gress and the western expansion prevailed.  The use-by-the-public test 
was abandoned, and the public purpose or benefit test27 was rein-
 17 Public Use Limitation, supra note 11, at 604. 
 18 Berger, supra note 15, at 208. 
 19 Id. 
 20 Public Use Limitation, supra note 11, at 601; see also Kelo v. City of New London, 
125 S. Ct. 2655, 2662 (2005); S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth. v. Nat’l City Envtl., 710 N.E.2d 896, 
900 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999). 
 21 Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896). 
 22 United States v. Gettysburg Elec. Ry. Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896). 
 23 Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896); Clark v. Nash, 198 
U.S. 361 (1905). 
 24 Improvement Co. v. Slack, 100 U.S. 648 (1880). 
 25 S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth., 710 N.E.2d at 900; Public Use Limitation, supra note 11, at 
599–600; see also Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906); 
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2681 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (noting that the “use of the eminent 
domain power was sparse at the time of the founding”). 
 26 Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 233–34 
(1897); Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2658 n.1; see also S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth., 710 N.E.2d at 899. 
 27 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (noting that “when this Court began applying the Fifth 
Amendment to the States at the close of the 19th century, it embraced the broader 
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stated.  One court called the public purpose standard a “more natural 
interpretation” of the Takings Clause.28  Under the public purpose 
test, the government may take property if it has shown a legitimate 
governmental reason or advantage.  In determining what constitutes 
a valid public benefit or purpose, the courts will ordinarily defer to 
the will of the legislature.  As a result, the list of public uses has grown 
significantly.  Hence, in the early twentieth century, most courts 
abandoned the “actual use” standard because it was too difficult to 
define,29 and adopted the public purpose test instead.30
Despite the broader public purpose view, the case law continued 
to cling to certain rubrics regarding the restrictions on the use of 
eminent domain.  Generally, the government could neither condemn 
private property to give it to another private individual,31 nor could it 
 
and more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose’”). 
     Underlying the majority and dissenting opinions, there is a basic disagreement 
about the extent to which the Constitution protects private property interests from 
government interference.  The Takings Clause may be a mere twelve words, but to 
Justice O’Connor “[i]t is against all reason and justice” for a people to entrust a legis-
lature with the power to “take[] property from A and give[] it to B.”  Id. at 2671 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386 (1798)).  Justice Tho-
mas believes that “the law of the land . . . postpone[s] even public necessity to the 
sacred and inviolable rights of private property.”  Id. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting) 
(quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 134–35 
(1765)). 
     Justice Stevens, on the other hand, sees the legal precedent in the historical con-
text of the takings clause much differently.  He notes that as far back as colonial 
times, the state legislature enacted, and courts upheld, economic development tak-
ings in the so-called mill acts.  Id. at 2681.  These laws allowed operators of gristmills 
to dam rivers in order to produce power for mill operations, such as grinding corn.  
If the uplands flooded as a result of the damming, then just compensation was re-
quired.  To Justice Stevens, a taking is permitted if there is a public benefit.  Id. at 
2662 n.8.  See generally Berger, supra note 15, at 204 (noting that these opposing views 
are both legitimate because “the origin of the Public Use requirement in America is 
perhaps more obscure” and that the “rival” requirement of actual use (narrow view) 
or public benefit (liberal view) have conflicted for centuries); Nathan Alexander 
Sales, Note, Classical Republicanism and the Fifth Amendment’s “Public Use” Requirement, 
49 DUKE L.J. 339, 340–41 (1999) (noting that although legal scholars tend to side 
with Stevens’s view, the real issue is whether private property rights outweigh the 
general welfare of the public at large). 
 28 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662 (citing Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 
112, 158–64 (1896)). 
 29 See Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527, 531 (1906) (ob-
serving the inadequacy of use-by-the-general-public as a universal test and applying 
the public purpose test); see also 2 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.2 (2002); see gen-
erally County of Essex v. Hindenlang, 114 A.2d 461, 466 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1955). 
 30 See Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662; see also Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 
112, 158–64 (1896). 
 31 See Mo. Pac. Ry. Co. v. Nebraska, 164 U.S. 403 (1896); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. 
Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 241 (1984); Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669; S.W. Ill. Dev. Auth., 710 
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take property where the taking favored a “private party, with only in-
cidental or pretextual public benefits.”32  With these caveats, the law 
remained generally the same for the next century.  Then came Kelo.  
In Kelo, the issue was whether privately owned land could be taken 
and conveyed to another private party for economic development 
purposes where the only public benefits—revitalization of a 
neighborhood—were intangible.33
B. Kelo v. City of New London 
New London, Connecticut was in an economic freefall in the 
early 1990s because the Navy closed its undersea warfare center lo-
cated at Fort Trumbull.  Unemployment in New London was twice 
the rate of the rest of the state.34  In 1990, Connecticut declared New 
London to be a distressed city.35  In January 1998, New London reac-
tivated the New London Development Corporation to spur economic 
development within the Fort Trumbull area.36  About a year later, a 
pharmaceutical company committed to constructing a $300 million 
research facility immediately adjacent to the Fort Trumbull area to 
take advantage of the tax incentives available to distressed cities.  The 
development district included 115 privately owned properties and 
thirty-two acres previously occupied by the naval facility.37  The devel-
opment plan included a waterfront conference hotel, pedestrian river 
 
N.E.2d at 901 (voiding a taking because it “involve[d] the taking of property from 
one private party and the immediate transfer to another private party, whose interest 
in the property [was] solely to earn greater profit”). 
 32 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  One New Jersey court has 
stated the rule to mean if “a condemnation is commenced for an apparently valid 
public purpose, but the real purpose is otherwise, the condemnation may be set 
aside.”  Casino Reinvestment. Dev. Auth. v. Banin, 727 A.2d 102, 103 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
Law Div.1998); see also Wilmington Parking Auth. v. Land with Improvements, 521 
A.2d 227 (Del. 1986); Atlantic City v. Cynwyd Invs., 689 A.2d 712, 721 (N.J. 1997). 
 33 As Justice Stevens acknowledged: 
     Two polar propositions are perfectly clear.  On the one hand, it has 
long been accepted that the sovereign may not take the property of A 
for the sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B, even 
though A is paid just compensation.  On the other hand, it is equally 
clear that a State may transfer property from one private party to an-
other if future “use by the public” is the purpose of the taking. . . .  Nei-
ther of these propositions, however, determines the disposition of this 
case. 
Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661. 
 34 Id. at 2658. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 2659.  The City of New London and the New London Development Cor-
poration are collectively referred to as “city” to the extent possible. 
 37 Id. 
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walk, eighty new residences, and a Coast Guard museum.  Addition-
ally, the plan called for development of 90,000 square feet of office 
and research space.  Finally, the marina area would be renovated and 
a 2.4-acre site, known as parcel 4A, would be used to support the ad-
jacent state park.38  The Development Corporation successfully nego-
tiated with all property owners except fifteen private homeowners.  In 
November 2000, the New London Development Corporation insti-
tuted condemnation proceedings to acquire the remaining fifteen 
lots.39
The affected homeowners form a very sympathetic group.  
Susette Kelo had substantially renovated her pink house, which she 
purchased in 1997.40  She “prize[d]” her beautiful waterfront views.41  
Another petitioner, Wilhemena Dery, was born in her Fort Trumbull 
home in 1918, and had lived there her entire life.42  Her husband had 
lived in the house since their marriage sixty years ago, and their son 
lived in the house next door.43  In all, the nine petitioners owned fif-
teen properties in the redevelopment area—four in the section des-
ignated for office and research and eleven in the park support area.44  
There was no allegation that the properties were blighted or other-
wise in poor condition.  The properties were to be leased to a devel-
oper for one dollar per year if the developer agreed to develop the 
line according to the development plan.45  The rationale for con-
demnation was that the homeowners’ lots were located within the re-
development sector, which would act “as a catalyst to the area’s [eco-
nomic] rejuvenation.”46
 Responding to the condemnation suit, the landowners claimed 
that the takings violated the public use restriction of the Fifth 
Amendment.  More particularly, they argued that the city was confis-
cating their property to give it to another private citizen and that 
these takings were not a “‘public’ [use] for purposes of the Fifth 
 38 Id.  The term “park support” drew criticism from the dissent.  Justice 
O’Connor remarked that “Parcel 4A is slated, mysteriously, for ‘park support’” and 
that “[a]t oral argument, [the city] conceded the vagueness of this proposed use  
. . . .”  Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). 
 39 Id. at 2660. 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id.  Ms. Kelo prefers to refer to her house as a cottage.  See The Cottage Coali-
tion, http://www.cottagecoalition.org (last visited Aug. 11, 2006). 
 42 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672. 
 43 Id. at 2660. 
 44 Id. 
 45 Id. at 2660 n.4. 
 46 Id. at 2659. 
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Amendment.”47
After a seven-day trial dominated by testimony of experts, includ-
ing planners and  urbanologists, the trial court issued a mixed deci-
sion.48  The court prohibited the taking of the properties that were 
within the park support area, but allowed condemnation of lots 
within the office and research section.49  On appeal, the Supreme 
Court of Connecticut upheld the city’s right to condemn all the 
properties.50  The court, relying on a Connecticut statute that author-
ized the use of eminent domain to acquire land for an economic de-
velopment project, held that such a taking for economic develop-
ment purposes is a “public use” and in the “public interest.”51  In 
essence, the Supreme Court of Connecticut found that the taking was 
reasonably necessary to achieve the city’s intended public use—
revitalization of the Fort Trumbull area.52  The state’s highest court 
held the use of the land designated for park support was “sufficiently 
definite” to satisfy the Takings Clause.53
Interestingly, three justices disagreed.54  They opined that a 
heightened standard of judicial scrutiny was necessary to justify tak-
ings for economic development purposes.55  These justices found that 
the plan was intended to serve a valid public use, but the takings in 
this instance were unconstitutional because the city had failed to 
show by “clear and convincing evidence” that the economic benefits 
of the development plan were achievable.56
C. United States Supreme Court Majority Opinion 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted the homeown-
ers’ petition for a writ of certiorari.  Justice Stevens, writing for the 
majority, acknowledged that a sovereign may neither take the prop-
erty of one person for the sole purpose of transferring it to another, 
nor may it take property under the pretext of a public purpose when 
 47 Id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 48 Kelo v. City of New London, No. 557299, 2002 Conn. Super LEXIS 789 (Conn. 
Super. Ct. Mar. 13, 2002). 
 49 Id. at 341. 
 50 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500 (Conn. 2004). 
 51 Id. at 512. 
 52 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2672. 
 53 Id. at 2661 (citing Kelo, 843 A.2d at 574). 
 54 Kelo, 843 A.2d at 574 (Zarella, J., joined by Sullivan, C.J., and Katz, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). 
 55 Id. at 587–92. 
 56 Id. at 578, 588. 
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the actual purpose is to bestow a private benefit.57  However, the ma-
jority upheld the taking because it was part of a statutory scheme 
which promoted a social good.  In applying the facts in Kelo to the 
case law, Justice Stevens found that the takings were part of a “care-
fully considered development plan” to revitalize the economy of New 
London.58  In such an instance, the Court, following judicial prece-
dent, deferred to the state legislature’s determination of what consti-
tutes the public good rather than substitute its own judgment. 
To support that conclusion, the majority traced the evolution of 
the meaning of the term “public use” through its prior rulings.  Its 
inquiry commenced with the case of Fallbrook Irrigation District v. Brad-
ley,59 where the Court abandoned the use-by-the-public test in favor of 
a “more natural interpretation of public use as ‘public purpose.’”60  
Justice Stevens explained that Fallbrook was in lockstep with the states, 
which at the time had “either circumvented the ‘use by public test’ 
when necessary or abandoned it completely.”61
 57 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2661–62. 
 58 Id. at 2661 (internal citations omitted). 
 59 164 U.S. 112 (1896).  In Fallbrook, the California legislature enacted a compre-
hensive statutory scheme to irrigate arid lands.  Id. at 151–52.  The Fallbrook Irriga-
tion District is a legislatively created district to bring water to arid lands so that they 
could be cultivated.  Id. at 151.  It assessed all property holders within the irrigation 
district a fee based upon its costs to develop and provide water to the arid properties.  
Id. at 153.  Bradley’s property was included within the District, but Bradley refused to 
pay the assessment because she contended that she received no benefit from the irri-
gation.  Id. at 156.  Pursuant to the statutory scheme, Fallbrook had the right to levy 
upon Bradley’s land due to non-payment.  Id. at 159.  Accordingly, Fallbrook fol-
lowed the statutory process and awarded a deed to a third party.  Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 
159.  Bradley sued to enjoin the levy arguing that it was tantamount to a taking and 
that there was no public use justifying the same.  Id. at 159.  She argued that the irri-
gation of arid land did not benefit the public but only served other private landown-
ers who could not cultivate their lands, and as a result, the taking did not meet the 
used-by-the-public test.  Id. at 156. 
     On that issue, the Court opined that resolution depended upon whether the irri-
gation district fit within the meaning of public use.  Id. at 158–59.  The Court held 
that whether a public use exists largely depends upon the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the particular matter.  Id. at 160.  The Court found “to irrigate [land] 
and thus to bring into possible cultivation” large masses of land is a ‘public purpose’ 
and a ‘matter of public interest.’”  Id. at 161.  Accordingly, Fallbrook set a precedent 
for many irrigation districts which aimed to cultivate about three million acres in the 
emerging West.  The fact that only a limited number of landowners benefited from 
the irrigation was not “fatal” to the statutory scheme.  Fallbrook, 164 U.S. at 161.  
Without substantial explanation, Justice Peckham invoked the words “public use,” 
“public purpose,” and “public interest” interchangeably, obviously assenting to a 
broad interpretation of public use.  Id. at 161–62. 
 60 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2662. 
 61 Id. at 2662 n.8; see generally Philip Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of 
Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 619–24 (1940). 
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The death knell for the use-by-the-public test sounded several 
years later in a case where mining interests were at stake.  In Strickley 
v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co.,62 land was condemned to accommo-
date an aerial bucket owned by a mining company.63  In order to 
connect the mining operations at the mountaintop to a rail depot in 
the valley, the line for the bucket had to cross privately owned land.64  
Since Utah statutes authorized the use of eminent domain for the 
construction of “tramways . . . to facilitate . . . the working of mines,”65 
and the Utah Supreme Court upheld the same as a valid public pur-
pose, Justice Holmes concluded that the Constitution “does not re-
quire us to say that they are wrong.”66  He emphasized that the use-by-
the-public test was inadequate,67 and as long as the legislature of the 
state expressed a reasonable public purpose to support the taking, 
then the taking was consistent with the Fifth Amendment.68  Since 
that time, the narrow use-by-the-public test has been “consistently re-
jected” by the Court.69
For the next fifty years after Strickley, the law of eminent domain 
remained relatively consistent, despite two world wars and the Great 
Depression.  In 1954, however, the Court expanded the government’s 
power again.  In Berman v. Parker,70 the Court confronted two issues: 
(1) whether Congress could condemn an entire area, rather than a 
 62 200 U.S. 527 (1906). 
 63 Id. at 529. 
 64 The facts of the case were undisputed.  The mining company constructed “an 
aerial bucket line” to transport ore about two miles down from a mountain top to a 
railroad depot.  Id. at 529.  Strickley had a placer mine interest in land which the ae-
rial line traversed.  Id. at 529–30.  At the time of condemnation, the mining company 
could not locate Strickley to negotiate an easement, so it paid monies into court.  Id. 
at 530.  Strickley did not object during construction of the aerial bucket line.  Id. 
 65 Strickley, 200 U.S. at 530. 
 66 Id. at 531.  In a later case, Justice Holmes said the decision of the legislature “is 
entitled to deference until it is shown to involve an impossibility.”  Old Dominion 
Land Co. v. United States, 269 U.S. 55, 66 (1925). 
 67 Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531.  Strickley can be factually distinguished from Kelo.  In 
Strickley, the taking involved air rights over a small swatch of property.  Id. at 529–30.  
Although the case does not precisely state as much, there was no substantial interfer-
ence with Strickley’s use of his land.  Kelo, however, involved a taking that removed 
people from their homes.  Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Although 
Thomas’s dissent in Kelo does limit the breadth of the ruling in Strickley, it does not 
factually distinguish it.  See id. at 2683–84 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 68 Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531–32. 
 69 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663; see also William B. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent 
Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553 (1972).  Professor Stoebuck muses: “Perhaps the public 
use doctrine still has enough vitality that someone might argue it as an objection to 
an excess condemnation, but with hardly an expectation of success.”  Id. at 590 (em-
phasis added). 
 70 48 U.S. 26 (1954). 
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specific lot, because the area was blighted; and (2) whether Congress 
could authorize conveyance of the disgorged property to another pri-
vate party for redevelopment.71  In Berman, there was expert testi-
mony that 64.3% of the houses within the redevelopment area were 
beyond repair, that 82.2% had no wash basins, and that 83.8% lacked 
heat.72  Berman owned a department store within the redevelopment 
area.73  He objected to the condemnation of his property because it 
was commercial, whereas the major object of the law was to redevelop 
residential property.74  He also argued that his store was in a state of 
good repair and not in need of redevelopment.75  Berman argued 
that no public purpose was served by the condemnation of his prop-
erty, especially since the findings of blight exclusively related to resi-
dential property.76
The Court disagreed.  Justice Douglas analyzed the case in terms 
of police powers, and found that it was “fruitless” to define the reach 
or “outer limits” of police power.77  Justice Douglas reasoned that the 
legislature, not the judiciary, properly determines the public interest 
 71 Id. 
 72 The federal legislation did not define what constitutes a slum or a blighted 
area, but it did set forth the meaning of substandard housing.  Id. at 28 n.1.  There 
are two major issues when condemning blighted zones: (1) the taking of property 
from one private person and giving it to another; and (2) redevelopment that is not 
used by the public, like a park or road.  Some states, recognizing the issues, specifi-
cally provide for use of condemnation to deal with blight.  In 1947, some seven years 
before the Berman decision, New Jersey adopted a new constitution which declared 
that redevelopment of blighted areas is a “public purpose and public use.”  N.J. 
CONST. art. VIII, § 3.  The section states in full: 
     Blighted areas, clearance, replanning, development or redevelop-
ment; tax exemption of improvements; use, ownership, management 
and control of improvements: 
(1) The clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment 
of blighted areas shall be a public purpose and public use, for 
which private property may be taken or acquired.  Municipal, 
public or private corporations may be authorized by law to un-
dertake such clearance, replanning, development or redevel-
opment; and improvements made for these purposes and uses, 
or for any of them, may be exempted from taxation, in whole or 
in part, for a limited period of time during which the profits of 
and dividends payable by any private corporation enjoying such 
tax exemption shall be limited by law.  The conditions of use, 
ownership, management and control of such improvements 
shall be regulated by law. 
Id. 
 73 Berman, 348 U.S. at 31. 
 74 Id. 
 75 Id. 
 76 Id. 
 77 Id. at 32. 
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and is the guardian of public needs.78  The Justice noted that this 
principle does not have any exceptions, including whether the exer-
cise of the power of eminent domain may be employed.79  In applying 
that standard, Justice Douglas noted that Congress decided to attack 
“blighted parts of the community on an area rather than on a struc-
ture-by-structure basis.”80  Since there were rational planning and 
health principles supporting the legislative plan, the Court would not 
second-guess Congress.81
Justice Stevens seized upon Berman as the underpinning of the 
Kelo decision.82  He reasoned that the legislature declared a legitimate 
public purpose and articulated a comprehensive plan of redevelop-
ment.  Accordingly, Justice Stevens concluded, as in Berman, that the 
exercise of the power of eminent domain was appropriate.83  In other 
words, the use of condemnation is “coterminous” with the exercise of 
police powers.84  Similarly to Berman, the Kelo court found that rede-
velopment need not be on a piecemeal basis, and the Court would 
defer to the legislature with regard to whether the area must be 
planned as a whole rather than on a parcel-by-parcel approach.85  To 
the majority, the argument that property cannot be taken in order to 
convey it to another private party is flawed.86  Justice Stevens en-
dorsed Justice Douglas’s rationale in Berman that Congress deter-
mines the public good and may rightfully conclude that “the public 
end may be . . . better served through an agency of private enter-
prise.”87
In addition to Berman, Justice Stevens relied upon Hawaii Hous-
ing Authority v. Midkiff88 for support.89  Justice Stevens opined that 
Midkiff stood for the proposition that eminent domain may be em-
 78 Id. 
 79 Berman, 348 U.S. at 33.  Justice Douglas declared that “[o]nce the object is 
within the authority of Congress, the means by which it will be attained is also for 
Congress to determine.”  Id. at 34. 
 80 Id. 
 81 Id. at 34–35.  Relying on the expert testimony that the entire area needed re-
designing in order to assure diversification of uses, Justice Douglas found that “diver-
sification in future use is . . . within congressional power.”  Id. at 35. 
 82 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2673 (2005). 
 83 Id. at 2663.  Justice Stevens noted that when reviewing whether a public pur-
pose exists, the Court has “defined that concept broadly, reflecting our longstanding 
policy of deference to legislative judgments in this field.”  Id. 
 84 Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240 (1984). 
 85 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2665. 
 86 Id. at 2676. 
 87 Id. at 2666 (quoting Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33–34 (1954)). 
 88 467 U.S. 229 (1984). 
 89 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674. 
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ployed liberally as a tool to correct a social wrong.90  Midkiff presented 
very extraordinary facts.  The issue was whether the Public Use Clause 
prohibited the State of Hawaii from taking title in real property from 
lessors and transferring it to lessees in order to eliminate the concen-
tration of fee simple ownership in the State.91  Factually, the state and 
federal government owned forty-nine percent of the land within Ha-
waii, and another forty-seven percent was owned by seventy-two pri-
vate landowners.92  The legislature found that such concentration of 
ownership skewed the real estate market and inflated prices to the 
detriment of the public.93  Accordingly, the legislature enacted a de-
tailed process that required, under certain circumstances, that prop-
erties of lessors be expropriated, and that the lessees take fee simple 
title.94  The lessors owned the property on which lessees constructed 
their dwellings.  The lessors would not convey the land to the home-
owners, effectively preventing working class persons from acquiring 
real property.  As in Fallbrook and Berman, there was a comprehensive 
statutory scheme detailing the reasons for condemnation and a spe-
cific statutory scheme to implement the statute.  In addition, the stat-
ute had a clear public purpose: to correct the manipulation of the 
real estate prices by an oligopoly.95
Justice O’Connor, writing for the unanimous Midkiff Court, 
found that the public purpose test was satisfied because the statute 
corrected “the perceived social and economic evils of a land oligop-
oly” similar to laws enacted by the original colonies.96  In dicta, she 
further noted that “one person’s property may not be taken for the 
benefit of another private person without a justifying public pur-
pose,”97 but in her view, the purpose of the Hawaii statute was suffi-
cient to warrant condemnation. 
In Kelo, Justice Stevens cites Midkiff for the proposition that “[i]t 
is only the taking’s purpose, and not its mechanics,” that matters in 
 90 Id. at 2661. 
 91 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 232–33. 
 92 Id.  The concentration of ownership was the remnant of a “feudal land tenure 
system” that existed for centuries prior to statehood.  Id. at 232. 
 93 Id. at 244. 
 94 Id. at 233–34. 
 95 Compare Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 (1896) (California 
statute establishing irrigation district), with Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954) 
(federal statute creating redevelopment area), and Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (Hawaii law 
ordaining housing authority). 
 96 Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 241–42.  In fact, dismantling oligopolies is a “classic exer-
cise” of police power according to Justice O’Connor.  Id. at 242. 
 97 Id. at 241 (quoting Thompson v. Consol. Gas Corp., 300 U.S. 55, 80 (1937)). 
SHERIDANFINAL2 1/22/2007  11:32:44 AM 
320 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:307 
                                                          
determining public use,98 and because breaking up a real estate oli-
gopoly is a bona fide public purpose, then condemnation is an ap-
propriate tool to achieve the legislative purpose.  Similarly in Kelo, 
because economic development is a permissible public purpose, the 
condemnation was authorized.  In conclusion, Justice Stevens found 
nothing inconsistent in allowing government to condemn property 
for the purpose of economic development so long as it is pursuant to 
“a comprehensive redevelopment plan” which, by its very terms, con-
templates that “the legal rights of all interested parties” would be 
considered.99
The majority found no reason to impose a new standard to deal 
with economic development takings.  In fact, the Court rebuffed two 
tests proffered by petitioners: a bright line test and a heightened 
scrutiny test.  The bright line test simply prohibits property from be-
ing taken for economic development purposes, while the heightened 
scrutiny test requires that the condemning authority show with rea-
sonable certainty that the public benefit will occur.100  The majority 
cast aside a bright line test because there is “no principled way of dis-
tinguishing economic development from [other takings].”101  The 
majority also dismissed the heightened level of review (reasonable 
certainty that public benefits would in fact occur), believing that it 
would impede redevelopment because “judicial approval” would be 
postponed until success of a project becomes likely.102  To the major-
ity, the only recourse for the petitioners and future property owners 
evicted for economic development purposes lies with the legislature, 
which has the authority to curtail the use of eminent domain by stat-
ute.103
D. Justice Kennedy’s Concurrence 
Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion states that a taking may be 
justified so long as there is a rational relationship between the public 
purpose and the property seized.  In other words, Justice Kennedy 
argues that a taking should be upheld as consistent with the Public 
Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment so long as it is rationally related 
 98 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2664 (2005) (quoting Midkiff, 467 
U.S. at 244). 
 99 Id. at 2668. 
 100 Id. at 2667–68. 
 101 Id. at 2665. 
 102 Id. at 2668. 
 103 Id. (stating that “nothing in our opinion precludes any State from placing fur-
ther restrictions on its exercise of the takings power”). 
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to the stated public purpose.104  The Justice acknowledges that a tak-
ing should be struck down if it is clearly intended to favor a particular 
private party over another, or only an incidental public benefit exists.  
In those instances, Justice Kennedy would find that no rational rela-
tionship existed between the taking and the public use.  To Justice 
Kennedy, economic development taking should be subject to the 
same test as economic regulations under the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses: the rational relationship test.  To him, this test 
would protect against arbitrary governmental action. 
Justice Kennedy’s opinion seemingly responded to the dissent of 
three members of the Connecticut Supreme Court, who opined that 
a higher scrutiny test should be applied to economic development 
takings.  According to their view, the government had the burden of 
proving by “clear and convincing” evidence that a public benefit ex-
isted, which would be something more than an undocumented in-
tangible benefit.105  Justice Kennedy’s analysis rejects this higher level 
of scrutiny.106  Comparing the standard of the dissenting Connecticut 
justices to Justice Kennedy’s standard, the takings in Kelo would be 
void in the former instance, but employing Justice Kennedy’s more 
relaxed standard, the takings would be upheld. 
E. Justice O’Connor’s Dissent 
The dissenters, rallying to preserve private property rights, did 
not mince words in their bitter criticism of the majority’s reasoning.  
Justice O’Connor found that intangible or incidental public benefits 
often associated with economic development, such as increased tax 
revenues, more jobs, and improved aesthetics, are insufficient predi-
cates to justify condemnation.107  To say otherwise is to “wash out any 
distinction between private and public use of property—and thereby 
effectively to delete the words ‘for public use’ from the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”108  Quoting Alexander Hamilton 
and James Madison in her defense of private property rights, Justice 
O’Connor declared that the public use requirement of the Fifth 
Amendment imposes a basic limitation on the government.109  In her 
 104 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 105 Kelo v. City of New London, 843 A.2d 500, 588 (Zarella, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
 106 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2669 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 107 Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor states in part that 
“the trouble with economic development takings is that private benefit and inciden-
tal public benefit are . . . merged . . . .”  Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 108 Id. at 2671 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 109 Id. at 2672 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Hamilton believed that one of the great 
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view, private property rights prevail over eminent domain unless the 
condemnation fits within one of three categories of takings.110
The three categories of takings are harmonious with the Public 
Use Clause.  Two of the three areas are uncontroversial.  First, the 
sovereign may take private property for public ownership for such 
things as roads.111  Second, the sovereign may transfer private prop-
erty from one person to another private party, so long as the property 
is used by the public, such as with common carriers like railroads and 
with public utilities like water, gas, and electric companies.112  The 
third category is novel: the sovereign may take private property if “the 
extraordinary, precondemnation use of the targeted property in-
flict[s] affirmative harm on society.”113  Berman and Midkiff fall within 
this third category.  In Berman, the harm was blight resulting from 
“extreme poverty,” and in Midkiff it was an oligopoly emanating from 
the “extreme wealth” of a few to the detriment of the public at 
large.114
Having established the extraordinary-harm-to-the-public stan-
dard, Justice O’Connor viewed the broad language in Berman and 
Midkiff as “errant.”115  She declared that the language, which states 
that the “public use requirement is coterminous with the scope of a 
sovereign’s police powers,” was unnecessary to decide those cases.116  
She explained that the language was not “put to a constitutional test,” 
and Kelo demonstrated why the “police power and ‘public use’ cannot 
always be equated.”117  In short, Justice O’Connor’s analysis distin-
guished Berman and Midkiff on the extraordinary-harm-to-the-public 
theory and limited them by declaring some of the key language to be 
 
aims of government is to secure property of citizens.  Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  
Similarly, Madison wrote a “just government” is one “which impartially secures to 
every man, whatever is his own.”  Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (quoting James Madison, 
Property, NAT’L GAZETTE, Mar. 29, 1792, reprinted in 14 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 266 
(R. Rutland et al. eds., 1983)). 
 110 Id. at 2673 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 111 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 112 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 113 Id. at 2674 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 114 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor’s social harm standard is 
novel.  There does not appear to be a case or legal scholar who has analyzed Berman 
or Midkiff in such a fashion prior to this decision. 
 115 Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).  Justice O’Connor authored 
the majority opinion in Midkiff.  The recharacterization of the language of that case 
as “errant” suggests that Justice O’Connor has reconsidered her position with regard 
to private property rights and the government’s ability to disgorge them. 
 116 Id. at 2676 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 117 Id. at 2675 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
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“errant” and “unnecessary.”118  In short, according to Justice 
O’Connor, economic development takings, without a showing of ex-
traordinary harm, cannot withstand constitutional protection af-
forded property owners. 
F. Justice Thomas’s Dissent 
Where Justice O’Connor attempted to distinguish the case law 
upon which the majority relied, Justice Thomas concluded that the 
case law should be reconsidered.  He recommended that the Public 
Use Clause cases be revisited and that the Court return to the stan-
dard “that the government may take property only if it actually uses 
or gives the public a legal right to use the property.”119  He viewed the 
public use phrase as an expressly enumerated liberty which limits the 
authority of government over the individual.120  This liberty is on par 
with other individual rights secured by the Fifth Amendment (e.g., 
double jeopardy, the right against self-incrimination, and due process 
of law).  As such, Justice Thomas argued that the Court should not 
construe “public use” in a manner that undermines private property 
rights by interpreting the clause broadly.  Accordingly, Justice Tho-
 118 Id. (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 119 Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Revisiting the early case law is appropriate 
in Justice Thomas’s view because prior holdings could have been more narrowly 
drawn in a manner consistent with the used-by-the-public test.  For example, regard-
ing the Supreme Court decision in Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112 
(1896) (fitting within the public purpose test (to cultivate arid lands)), Justice Tho-
mas argued for the used-by-the-public test because “similarly situated members of the 
public . . . had a right to use it.”  Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2683 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
Similarly, in Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906), which 
upheld a taking to construct an aerial bucket, the use fell within the used-by-the-
public test because “the plaintiff [was] a carrier for itself and others” and therefore, 
it was for a protected class.  Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2684 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Strickley, 200 U.S. at 531–32).  In addition, Justice Thomas argued that the case estab-
lishing that the courts will defer to a legislature in determining public purpose 
should have been decided on the used-by-the-public test.  Id. at 2679 (Thomas, J., 
dissenting).  In United States v. Gettysburg Electric Railway Co., 160 U.S. 668 (1896), 
the issue was whether the government could condemn land for the purpose of build-
ing a battlefield memorial.  Since the government was actually using the property, 
there was no need for the Court to gratuitously add that “when the legislature has 
declared the use or purpose to be a public one, its judgment will be respected by the 
courts, unless the use be palpably without reasonable foundation.”  Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 
2684 (Thomas, J. dissenting) (quoting Gettysburg Elec. Ry. 160 U.S. at 680). 
     Justice Thomas saw no alternative for cases like Berman and Midkiff but to recon-
sider them.  He argued that the public purpose test, as enunciated in those cases, 
“cannot be applied in a principled manner” because “no coherent principle limits 
what could constitute a valid public use.”  Id. at 2686 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  Ac-
cordingly, the cited precedent in Kelo obliterates an enumerated right of an individ-
ual against government interference.  Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 120 See id. at 2678 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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mas concluded that the Court should not defer to the legislative find-
ings of what constitutes a “public use” when an enumerated right of 
an individual is at stake because the courts have long been recog-
nized by the public as the protectors of enumerated rights. 
The Kelo decision has triggered a groundswell of opposition.  In 
one way, it is difficult to understand the outcry because the public has 
long supported policies to rejuvenate our cities.  On the other hand, 
the thought that some bureaucrat may unilaterally dispossess home-
owners of their property is rather unsettling.  As a result, Congress 
has conducted hearings on the decision.  In early November 2005, 
the House of Representatives passed a bill that prohibited the use of 
federal funds on any projects where property is condemned for eco-
nomic development purposes.121  Hence, there may be a legislative 
solution.  However, since condemnation is primarily a tool of state 
and local government, it is worthwhile to review the laws and policies 
in New Jersey, which is a microcosm of most of the industrialized 
states. 
II. KELO’S APPLICATION TO NEW JERSEY EMINENT DOMAIN 
A. New Jersey Condemnation 
New Jersey is often considered a bedroom community for those 
working in New York City and Philadelphia.  It is the most densely 
populated state in the country, at 1165 persons per square mile.122  
The population is denser than India (914 persons per square mile) 
and Japan (835 persons per square mile).123  According to some plan-
ners, New Jersey may be the “first fully built-out state in the coun-
try.”124  It stands to reason that in New Jersey, as large tracts of land 
capable of development dwindle, there will be increasing pressure to 
redevelop the state’s deteriorated industrial areas.  Developers are al-
ready interested, and cities including Newark, Bayonne, Camden, 
Perth Amboy, and Asbury Park all have redevelopment areas.  Devel-
opers often require the assistance of the government, through emi-
nent domain, to assemble the land necessary for a redevelopment 
project.  Accordingly, the impact of the Kelo decision on New Jersey 
will be almost immediate. 
 121 See Private Property Rights Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 4128, 109th Cong. 
(2005). 
 122 Gertner, supra note 5, at 46, 52. 
 123 Id. 
 124 Id. 
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B. New Jersey Law Pre-Kelo 
Similar to the federal Constitution, the New Jersey Constitution 
provides that “private property shall not be taken for public use with-
out just compensation.”125  Unlike the United States Constitution, 
New Jersey’s constitution specifically provides that the redevelopment 
of blighted areas is “a public purpose and public use, for which pri-
vate property may be taken or acquired.”126  Prior to Kelo, the case law 
liberally authorized the use of eminent domain.  In fact, legal prac-
tice books did not even pay lip service to a narrow reading of public 
use.  The law was so well-settled that the practice series merely stated 
“that full payment [must] be made for any private property taken for 
a public purpose.”127
In New Jersey, the right of the government to take property in 
furtherance of the common good is beyond peradventure.  In 1938, 
New Jersey Supreme Court Justice Heher declared that the public 
welfare was of “prime importance,” and the squelching of property 
rights was “a negligible loss” considering the benefit to the commu-
nity.128  More specifically, he stated: 
The state possesses the inherent authority—it antedates the con-
stitution—to resort, in the building and expansion of its commu-
nity life, to such measures as may be necessary to secure the essen-
tial common material and moral needs.  The public welfare is of 
prime importance; and the correlative restrictions upon individ-
ual rights—either of person or of property are incidents of the so-
cial order, considered a negligible loss compared with the resul-
 125 N.J. CONST. art. I, § 20.  Section 20 states: “Private property shall not be taken 
for public use without just compensation.  Individuals or private corporations shall 
not be authorized to take private property for public use without just compensation 
first made to the owners.”  Id. 
 126 N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3.  This provision states that development of a blighted 
area is a public use and public benefit: 
     The clearance, replanning, development or redevelopment of 
blighted areas shall be a public purpose and public use, for which pri-
vate property may be taken or acquired.  Municipal, public or private 
corporations may be authorized by law to undertake such clearance, 
replanning, development or redevelopment; and improvements made 
for these purposes and uses, or for any of them, may be exempted from 
taxation, in whole or in part, for a limited period of time during which 
the profits of and dividends payable by any private corporation enjoy-
ing such tax exemption shall be limited by law.  The conditions of use, 
ownership, management and control of such improvements shall be 
regulated by law. 
Id. 
 127 35 N.J. PRACTICE § 10.1 (1999) (emphasis added). 
 128 Mansfield & Swelt Inc. v. Town of W. Orange, 198 A. 225, 229 (N.J. 1938); Wil-
son v. City of Long Branch, 142 A.2d 837, 843 (N.J. 1958). 
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tant advantages to the community as a whole.129
Obviously, in accord with this broad language, New Jersey adopted 
the liberal view of what constitutes public use.130
In light of this statement, New Jersey courts have not dwelled on 
the different tests for defining public use.  The last time it was at issue 
was in the mid-1950s, in County of Essex v. Hindenlang.131  In that mat-
ter, Judge Goldmann of the Appellate Division analyzed the narrow 
and liberal tests for determining public use.132  Rejecting the narrow 
view, he concluded that Essex County may condemn land to con-
struct a parking lot next to county buildings because the use “is 
clearly for the public benefit, to the public advantage, and has public 
utility.”133  Interestingly, however, the decision did not require this 
analysis because the county was the developer of the lot.  Hence, the 
taking would have aptly fit within the narrower test. 
In general terms, New Jersey eminent domain law can be sum-
marized as follows: “[T]he individual must bow to the public welfare 
and accept just compensation for his deprivation.”134  Public use is sat-
isfied when the taking “tends to enlarge resources, increase the in-
dustrial energies and . . . manifestly contribute[s] to the general wel-
 129 Mansfield & Swelt, 198 A.  at 229; Wilson, 142 A.2d at 843. 
 130 See Wilson, 142 A.2d at 844–45; N.J. Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Agency v. Moses, 
521 A.2d 1307, 1311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987); Tide-Water Co. v. Coster, 18 
N.J. Eq. 518 (1866). 
 131 114 A.2d 461 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1955). 
 132 Judge Goldmann defined the narrow and liberal tests as: 
     Courts dealing with problems of eminent domain have generally 
been reluctant to define the phrase “public use.”  . . . [T]hey have rec-
ognized that the phrase “is incapable of a precise and comprehensive 
definition of universal application.” 
. . . 
     Judicial attempts to describe the subjects to which the expression 
“public use” would apply have proceeded on two different theories.  
One theory of “public use” limits its application to “use by the pub-
lic”—public service or employment.  . . . 
     Courts that take the broader and more liberal view in sustaining 
public rights at the expense of property rights hold that “public use” is 
synonymous with “public benefit,” “public advantage” or “public util-
ity.” 
Id. at 466–67 (citations omitted). 
 133 Id. at 468; see also Albright v. Sussex County Lake & Park Comm’n., 57 A. 398, 
400 (N.J. 1904); State v. Totowa Lumber & Supply Co., 232 A.2d 655, 660 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1967) (wherein the court permitted taking of land for an access 
route which served a single private landowner). 
 134 See Wilson v. City of Long Branch, 142 A.2d 837, 843, 856–57 (N.J. 1958) (al-
though property owners showed that their homes were in good repair, they were still 
subject to declaration of blight). 
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fare.”135 The reach of the government is so long that the Appellate 
Division upheld the Housing and Mortgage Finance Agency’s taking 
of a property for development of a shopping center on behalf of a 
private developer on the basis that the shopping center was a sup-
porting facility to its statutory purpose of home construction.136
In fact, it can be argued that in New Jersey the right of the sov-
ereign to take property is upheld unless there is some showing of bad 
faith.  Generally, courts will not interfere with a decision to use emi-
nent domain in the absence of “fraud, bad faith or manifest abuse.”137  
For example, in Casino Reinvestment Development Authority v. Banin,138 
the Superior court set aside a condemnation by the Casino Reinvest-
ment Development Authority (“CRDA”) in furtherance of a casino 
hotel project by Trump Properties.139  The condemned property abut-
ted a 360-room hotel project, and the property was allegedly to be 
used for parking and open space.  But the agreement entered be-
tween the CRDA and Trump Properties was not so definite.  The 
court found that the agreement was ambiguous because Trump 
Properties could, under certain circumstances, use the condemned 
area for other purposes in the future.140  The court held that the only 
reasonable conclusion was that the condemnation was to convey the 
land to Trump Properties without a sound governmental reason.  
The court held that a condemnation will be set aside if it is com-
menced “for an apparently valid public purpose, but the real purpose 
is otherwise.”141
Similarly, in Borough of Essex Fells v. Kessler Institute for Rehabilita-
tion, 142 Judge Fuentes of the Superior court ruled that a taking may be 
set aside if the municipality acted in bad faith or acted “with a furtive 
design . . . or ill will.”143  In Borough of Essex Fells, the condemnation of 
land for use as a public park was set aside when the real purpose was 
shown to be an attempt by the condemnor to exclude development 
 135 Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86, 91 (N.J. 2002) (quoting JULIUS 
L. SACKMAN, 2A NICHOLS’ THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 7.02 (3d ed. 1990)). 
 136 N.J. Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Agency v. Moses, 521 A.2d 1307, 1311 (N.J. Super. 
Ct. App. Div. 1987) (dismissed on procedural grounds).  There was no comprehen-
sive development plan or finding of blight. 
 137 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d. at 90. 
 138 727 A.2d 102 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1998). 
 139 Id. at 109. 
 140 Id. at 110. 
 141 Id. at 103; see also City of Atl. City v. Cynwyd Invs., 689 A.2d 712, 721 (N.J. 
1997). 
 142 673 A.2d 856 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995).   
 143 Id. at 861; see also Essex County Improvement Auth. v. RAR Dev. Assocs., 733 
A.2d 580, 585 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1999). 
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of a rehabilitation center.144
More recently, in Mount Laurel v. Mipro Homes, L.L.C., the Appel-
late Division upheld Mount Laurel’s decision to condemn property to 
thwart residential development.145 In that case, the township issued an 
Open Space Recreation Plan and amended the plan to include a 
16.3-acre parcel of land when it became known that the site plan for 
the property had been altered from an assisted living facility that in-
cluded units affordable to low- and moderate-income residents, to a 
plan to construct twenty-three single-family residences.146  When good 
faith negotiations to purchase the property proved unsuccessful, the 
township filed a declaration of taking.147  The Appellate Division held 
that the condemnation was for a valid purpose and found no “af-
firmative showing of fraud, bad faith or manifest abuse.”148
The court, however, theorized that had Mount Laurel attempted 
to condemn the property of Mipro’s predecessor, which planned an 
assisted living facility, a finding of abuse of eminent domain power 
might have been warranted.149  New Jersey law appears to be more 
liberal than federal law because Banin and Borough of Essex Fells ap-
pear to shift the burden of proof to the party opposing the condem-
nation and impose an affirmative duty on landowners to present 
proof that the taking is not for a public use.  This standard requires 
that landowners show that the condemnor acted in bad faith. 
The judiciary’s liberal view of condemnation also extends to the 
New Jersey legislature.  The state government has empowered nu-
merous municipalities, counties, and independent authorities to 
condemn property for economic development and redevelopment 
reasons.  The extent to which the legislature has authorized eminent 
domain for economic development projects can best be illustrated 
through the Local Redevelopment and Housing Law (“LRHL”).150
In New Jersey, any municipality may establish a redevelopment 
agency pursuant to the LRHL.151  There are currently eighteen rede-
velopment agencies.  A redevelopment agency established pursuant 
to the LRHL has condemnation powers.152  To create a redevelop-
 144 Borough of Essex Fells, 673 A.2d at 858. 
 145 878 A.2d 38 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2005). 
 146 Id. at 43. 
 147 Id. 
 148 Id. at 48–49 (quoting Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86, 90 (N.J. 
2002) (quoting City of Trenton v. Lenzner, 109 A.2d 409, 413 (N.J. 1954)). 
 149 Id. at 49. 
 150 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-1 (West 2006). 
 151 Id. § 40A:12A-4(c).  There are 518 municipalities in New Jersey. 
 152 Id. § 40A:12A-8(c). 
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ment agency, the municipality must follow a statutory process which 
includes an investigation and holding a public hearing on whether 
the area is in need of redevelopment.153  In order to designate a rede-
velopment area, the LRHL requires that one of eight ill-defined rea-
sons exist.  These include, but are not limited to, a finding that the 
generality of buildings are sub-standard, there has been an aban-
donment of land, or there has been lack of proper utilization.154  
Once the reason, or reasons, have been established through evi-
dence, the municipality may draft a very detailed redevelopment 
plan.155  The development plan must address a number of issues, in-
cluding the displacement of residents.  Development may ensue 
thereafter, including the right to take property pursuant to the 
plan.156
Courts have routinely upheld a municipality’s action to create a 
redevelopment area, so long as it is based on substantial evidence.157  
A finding of one of the eight reasons enumerated in the statute has 
been ruled to constitute blight as stated in the New Jersey Constitu-
tion.158  As a result, redevelopment agencies have flourished through-
out the state.  The “relative affluence of the community is irrele-
vant,”159 and not every property within the redevelopment area needs 
to be substandard for an area to qualify for redevelopment.160  In 
short, the application of the law is broad, and the standard justifying 
the creation of a redevelopment agency is easily attainable. 
In addition to redevelopment agencies and county improvement 
authorities,161 there are other agencies that unexpectedly possess 
condemnation powers for economic development purposes.  For ex-
 153 Id. § 40A:12A-6.  More specifically, the statute requires: (a) resolution by the 
municipality requiring a planning board to investigate whether redevelopment meets 
statutory criteria; (b) a public hearing to be conducted; (c) notice to landowners; (d) 
recommendation of delineation of redevelopment area by planning board; (e) mu-
nicipality may adopt a recommendation based on substantive evidence; and (f) no-
tice to be sent to impacted property owners.  Id. 
 154 Id. § 40A:12A-5. 
 155 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40A:12A-7 (West 2006). 
 156 Id. § 40A:12A-8(c). 
 157 Levin v. Twp. Comm. of Bridgewater, 274 A.2d 1, 18 (N.J. 1971). 
 158 See N.J. CONST. art. VIII, § 3. 
 159 Concerned Citizens of Princeton, Inc. v. Borough of Princeton, 851 A.2d 685, 
689 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2004), cert. denied, 182 N.J. 139 (2004) (condemnation 
was not at issue). 
 160 Forbes v. Bd. of Trs. of the Twp. of S. Orange Vill., 712 A.2d 255, 262 (N.J. Su-
per. Ct. App. Div. 1998). 
 161 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:37A-69 (West 2006).  County improvement authorities 
may condemn land for benefit of the tourist industry and redevelopment of deterio-
rated areas. 
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ample, the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, which was 
conceived to operate bridges, tunnels, and ports, was granted author-
ity to exercise eminent domain for industrial development.162  Simi-
larly, the Delaware River Port Authority, whose original purpose was 
to construct and operate certain bridges, was empowered in the late 
1890s to undertake economic development projects and to utilize the 
power of condemnation.163  Additionally, the New Jersey Economic 
Development Authority, which is primarily a financing entity for  pri-
vate companies, may condemn property with the local government’s 
consent on behalf of those private interests.164  Finally, the New Jersey 
Educational Facility Authority, which finances capital projects for 
public and private institutions of higher education, may condemn 
land, even on behalf of a private institution.165
Unequivocally, the policy of the State of New Jersey has been to 
use eminent domain as a means of fostering economic development 
and redevelopment.  In response to Kelo, however, New Jersey courts 
and the state legislature may reverse this direction. 
 162 See id. §§ 32:1-35.72(c)–(d), 32:1-35.85.  The Port Authority of New York and 
New Jersey was conceived in the 1920s to operate ports and bridges.  Later, it was au-
thorized by New York and New Jersey to engage in industrial development to prevent 
the erosion of the tax base and, if necessary, to use eminent domain to accomplish 
that goal.  Id. 
 163 See id. §§ 32:3-6, 13.23.  The Delaware River Port Authority originally operated 
some bridges between New Jersey and Pennsylvania.  Later, it was statutorily enabled 
to undertake economic development projects and exercise eminent domain for so 
long as it served the “sound economic development of the Port District.”  Id. § 32:3-
13.23. 
     The Delaware River Basin Authority may “acquire by condemnation” property for 
any authorized project.  Id. § 32:11D-100.  This includes cooperating with “private 
agencies.”  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 32:11D-43 (West 2006).  The Delaware River and Bay Au-
thority is now permitted “to acquire (by gift, purchase or condemnation)” “economic 
development projects . . . at its own initiative,” including an industrial park in Salem 
County.  Id. § 32:11E-1. 
     The Casino Reinvestment Development Authority was created in the early 1980s 
and empowered to exercise eminent domain in Atlantic City because casino gaming 
was authorized as a unique tool for urban development.  Id. § 5:12-160, 182. 
 164 See id. § 34:1B-5(d).  The New Jersey Economic Development Authority was 
created in the 1950s and may exercise eminent domain for almost any type of project 
with several caveats.  The agency must obtain the consent of the municipality where 
the property is located, and the municipality must not be receiving supplemental 
school aid, or the municipality must have a population of more than 10,000, accord-
ing to the most recent federal census.  Id. 
 165 See id. §§ 18A:72A-1, 5(g).  The Educational Facilities Authority, which largely 
finances higher education facilities for public and private institutions, may acquire 
land by condemnation that is reasonably necessary for its projects, including those 
projects at private institutions. 
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C. Post-Kelo: Case Law and Legislative Initiative 
Since the Kelo decision, the tables have seemingly turned on the 
condemnors.  In the months following the Kelo decision, there have 
been three trial court decisions concerning condemnation.  These 
decisions acknowledged the broad holding of Kelo, but found that the 
condemnor manifestly abused its power, and tossed the condemna-
tion actions.  None of the decisions relied on Justice O’Connor’s dis-
sent in Kelo, but it is obvious that these recent cases break from a long 
line of precedent that relentlessly ruled in favor of the government’s 
power.  Specifically, a taking by the New Jersey Department of Trans-
portation was dismissed because it was based on “contradictory and 
untrustworthy information,” which is startlingly contrary to a strong 
policy which favors condemnation for roads.166  In another matter, a 
municipality was declared to have acted in bad faith.167  Finally, the 
condemnation of a trailer park was set aside because there was no 
substantial evidence of blight.168  Hence, it appears that the trial 
courts, through findings of fact rather than groundbreaking laws, 
have heard the public’s criticism of unfettered use of condemnation.  
Although these cases may be a bellwether of what is to come, it re-
mains to be seen what the policy of the appellate courts will be in the 
future. 
Similarly to the trial courts, the legislature has also reacted.  On 
June 8, 2006, New Jersey Assembly introduced Bill A-3257 (“the bill”).  
It amends LRHL. It has been passed by the Assembly and is pending 
before the Senate. To date, the Senate has not taken action on the 
bill.  The legislative purpose of the bill is “to ensure that the use of 
eminent domain for redevelopment is an absolute last resort.”169  The 
bill imposes objective criteria to determine whether “blight” exists. 
Under this legislative proposal, in order to take a residential prop-
erty, there must be evidence that the redevelopment area consists of 
 166 N.J. Dep’t of Transp. v. ADPP Enters., No. L-1426-04 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 
June 13, 2005).  This case flies in the face of case law because as recently as 2002, the 
New Jersey Supreme Court acknowledged that a taking for a roadway “is undeniably 
for a public use.”  Twp. of W. Orange v. 769 Assocs., 800 A.2d 86, 91 (N.J. 2002) 
(quoting N. Baptist Church v. Mayor & Common Council of the City of Orange, 22 
A. 1004, 1004 (N.J. 1891)). 
 167 Order of Dismissal, Twp. of Bloomfield v. 110 Wash. St. Assocs., No. 2318-05 
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 2005), available at http://www.njeminentdomain.com/ 
Order%20of%20Dismissal%20-%20Bloomfield.pdf. 
 168 LBK Assocs. v. Borough of Lodi, No. 8766-03 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Oct. 6, 
2005), available at http://www.njeminentdomain.com/44-3-1792%20LBK% 
20ASSOCS.%20L.L.C.%20V.%20BOROUGH%20OF%20LODI%2C%20ET%20AL.
%3B%20ONE%20OTHE%20CAPTION.PDF. 
 169 Assemb. B. 3257, 212th Leg., (N.J. 2006). 
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properties that are detrimental to the safety, health, and welfare of 
the community. To prove such detriment there must be a showing of 
“substantial” health or building code violations at the site or lack of 
structural integrity.170  For commercial properties, the standard is 
more liberal. The objective evidence to warrant use of eminent do-
main may include “underutilization” of land or structures resulting in 
property that is “stagnant and not fully productive.”171
However, the legislature has carved out an exception to the ob-
jective criteria.  That is, the statute permits that twenty percent of the 
land mass within the redevelopment zone need not meet the objec-
tive tests. As a practical result, whether this bill constitutes any mean-
ingful change in the use of eminent domain is subject to debate. For 
example, the twenty percent carve-out would mean that most, if not 
all, Kelo plaintiffs would remain subject to eminent domain.172The bill 
may not accomplish much with regard to commercial properties ei-
ther. As discussed in Berman v. Parker above, the condemned parcel 
was a department store. Under the bill, a commercial property may 
be condemned if it is “underutilized.” Hence, if a municipality de-
termines that a commercial building is not fully productive like the 
department store in Berman, it may be condemned even if it is an on-
going concern. 
As the legislature mulls over the bill, there are real-life situations 
which question whether the bill will meet the legislative objective if 
enacted. One such case is in Trenton, New Jersey, where recently, a 
substantial developer wishes to convert an abandoned Champale fac-
tory site into eighty-four condominiums.173  The rub is that the devel-
oper is requiring the city to acquire twelve parcels (or a portion of a 
parcel) that abuts the Champale site. These parcels are small but the 
homes are well-kept.174  In all likelihood these homes total less than 
twenty percent of the land mass in the redevelopment area. Hence, 
the bill would probably offer no relief to the homeowners because of 
the carve-out, were it to be enacted.  
 170 Id. 
 171 Id. 
 172 In Kelo, the 32-acre redevelopment area consisted of 115 privately owned 
homes and Fort Trumbull Park (18 acres).  That means that 115 residences were lo-
cated on 14 acres (32 acres minus 18 acres).  If A-3257 were applicable to Kelo, 20% 
of the 32 acres, or 6.4 acres, need not meet the definition of blight.  It stands to rea-
son that since 115 parcels were located on 14 acres, the 15 Kelo plaintiffs occupied 
less than 6.4 acres.  Accordingly, under the terms of A-3257, the Kelo properties were 
subject to condemnation.  
 173 Eva Loayza, Condo Plan Upsets Residents, TRENTON TIMES, October 19, 2006, at 
A1. 
 174 Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
But the “development and direction of constitutional law also 
shift . . . with the Court’s changing composition.”175  Since two new 
Justices, Roberts and Alito, have been appointed since the Kelo deci-
sion, their “readings of the Constitution” may “differ” from their 
predecessors.176 Rather than settle an area of law, Kelo has sparked an 
“ongoing dialogue over the exercise of and limitations” on the use of 
eminent domain among legislators, political commentators, and the 
citizenry.177
In short, reconsideration could occur.  In this area of constitu-
tional law, the Roberts Court could quickly imprint its mark on the 
relationship between the government and property owners.  If this 
occurs, the Roberts Court has alternatives.  First, it may hold the line 
and uphold Kelo.  Second, it could adopt Justice O’Connor’s theory 
that economic development takings violate the public use require-
ment unless some substantial harm to the public can be shown.  
Third, the Court could adopt a new standard similar to that of the 
dissenting justices of the Connecticut Supreme Court, wherein a 
heightened level of scrutiny is imposed to justify economic develop-
ment takings.  Fourth, the Court could follow the enumerated rights 
argument of Justice Thomas.  Finally, the Roberts Court could find a 
new balance, one that accommodates property rights and the rede-
velopment needs of worn-out Northeastern industrial areas of bygone 
years, like New London, Connecticut. 
In New Jersey, there are many cities and towns that require rede-
velopment.  In the past, the courts have accommodated the need for 
redevelopment by liberally permitting condemnation.  On the other 
hand, the number of homeowners, particularly in our urban areas, 
has been steadily rising.  Average folks are afraid that the government 
may take their single most important investment for little reason.  
The issue is currently front and center in both the courts and the leg-
islature, and it deserves attention and re-evaluation in light of the 
present circumstances. 
Although the courts and the legislature are empowered to review 
and revise the use of condemnation, the primary holders of the pow-
ers of eminent domain are the appointed and elected officials of re-
development boards and authorities.  These officials must carefully 
consider their exercise of the eminent domain power, recognizing 
 175 1 DAVID M. O’BRIEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND POLITICS, Preface (5th Ed. W.W. 
Norton & Co. 2003). 
 176 Id. 
 177 Id. 
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the plight of homeowners who may be dispossessed by their actions.  
Board members should ardently search for creative solutions that ac-
commodate private property rights, hopefully without grinding rede-
velopment to a halt. 
 
 
